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10.1  Introduction 
Under the present international monetary system, a large number of 
countries peg their exchange rates in some way, and a fair number of 
small countries peg to a single currency. Few countries, however, are 
members of  exchange rate unions in which the rates are collectively 
pegged to a single currency or basket of currencies. 
Even fewer countries establish a full monetary union, with a union- 
wide central bank. In fact, until the transformation of the East Carib- 
bean  Currency Authority  into a central bank  in October  1983, the 
closest examples were the monetary institutions of the Franc Zone. 
In particular, the West African Monetary Union (known by its French 
abbreviation UMOA) consists of former French colonies in West Af- 
rica that have maintained a fixed bilateral  exchange rate against the 
French franc since October  1948. That they have done so is all the 
more remarkable in light of the repeated changes in the parity of  the 
French  franc  relative  to  the  dollar  and  to  other  major  European 
currencies. 
Actual monetary unions may be few, but nonetheless a considerable 
analytic literature on the subject exists. It emerged during the 1960s in 
connection with  the celebrated controversy over the  desirability  of 
fixed versus flexible exchange rates, and it was revived with the cre- 
ation of  the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979.' 
Jorge Braga de Macedo is an assistant professor of economics and international affairs 
at Princeton University and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the NBER-World  Bank conference 
and in a seminar at the University of Pennsylvania. Comments from the participants are 
gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are my own. 
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There is a general agreement that the key factors on which the impact 
of  a monetary union depends are, first, the sources and types of eco- 
nomic disturbances giving rise to exchange rate fluctuations; second, 
the trade patterns of the country joining the union; and third, wage and 
price behavior  at home and abroad.  As Marston (1984a) stated, the 
conditions under which a fixed exchange rate regime is superior to a 
rate that  floats according to some social welfare criterion involve a 
complicated weighting of these key factors, making any generalizations 
about the unions difficult. 
The model of a monetary union presented in this paper is designed 
to illuminate monetary and exchange rate policy in the West African 
Monetary Union. The discussion centers on the interaction of UMOA 
members with one another, through the common central bank, and on 
their interaction with France and the rest of  the world.  As a conse- 
quence, the structure of the national economies is highly stylized. In- 
deed, country size is the major structural characteristic in the model. 
The relative size of the partners is of course reflected in the sources 
and types of disturbances, as well as in the trade pattern. Although the 
model can also account for real and nominal wage rigidities, the focus 
is on the two key factors just mentioned. In the model, therefore, large 
countries (such as France) are not affected by disturbances originating 
in small countries, but small countries (such as the members of UMOA) 
are affected by domestic disturbances in the large countries. The col- 
lective nature of the pegging is important because the small countries 
are assumed to be of equal size. 
The paper is divided into two parts.  Section 10.2 presents a four- 
country macroeconomic  model in  which one of two large countries 
establishes what  Corden (1972) would  call a pseud-xchange  rate 
union with two small countries, which together form a full monetary 
union with their own central bank. The effect of the arrangement on 
monetary and real disturbances originating inside and outside the union 
is analyzed. 
The pseudo-exchange rate union with the large partner is shown to 
have no effect on the real exchange rates of the small countries but to 
affect their  price levels, whereas  a full monetary union  requires in 
principle a transfer whose allocation between the two small countries 
may have real effects. This transfer is provided by the large country, 
as guarantor of the fixed exchange rate arrangement. Because of size 
differences, the converse is not true. When both small countries are 
in  surplus, there  is a reverse transfer  to the large country, with no 
monetary consequences. 
The characterization of the UMOA in section 10.3 begins with an 
overview of African monetary history, contrasting the experience of 
the Franc Zone with that of the former British colonies along lines 
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rough indicators of financial development to compare several African 
countries,  the analysis shows that in the 1970s the countries of  the 
Franc Zone increased their propensity to hold near-money at a faster 
rate than the countries of the Sterling Zone of Africa. This finding is 
consistent with the emphasis of the model on the requirement of  a 
transfer from France to guarantee the fixed exchange rate agreement. 
Evidence on the composition of the money stock in the UMOA confirms 
the importance of the French transfer. 
A comparison of nominal and real effective exchange rates in several 
African countries yields mixed results, but as mentioned in the con- 
clusion, the pattern of relative price adjustment among members of the 
UMOA does seem to reflect the emphasis on monetary allocations. In 
effect, surplus countries such as Ivory Coast experienced real appre- 
ciations, whereas deficit countries such as Senegal experienced real 
depreciations. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that although the model is designed 
to illuminate the workings of  the West African Monetary Union, the 
two parts of  the paper  are largely self-contained. In  particular,  the 
possible real effects of the union cannot be ascertained by the evidence 
provided in section 10.3. 
10.2  A Model of Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
10.2.1 
The model  consists of  standard aggregate demand  and  aggregate 
supply relationships, with trade and capital movements linking national 
economies.* Account is taken of the unequal size of the potential part- 
ners by modeling two pairs of identical economies, one large and one 
small. In the two identical large economies the bilateral exchange rate 
floats freely. In the two identical small economies the authorities decide 
whether  to float their exchange rate or fix  it  with one of  the large 
countries; in so doing, they also allow the unionwide central bank to 
decide on monetary allocations. 
Because of the difference in size between the partners in the union, 
only the distribution of  money  between  the two small countries  is 
endogenously determined, but even there it can be modified by the 
allocation of  a monetary transfer from the large partner. There is a 
pseudo-exchange  rate union between one of the large countries and 
the two small countries but full monetary integration between the two 
small countries. 
Each national economy is highly stylized, and the model focuses on 
the interaction of the members of the monetary union-the  two small 
countries, labeled country  1 (Senegal) and country 2 (Ivory Coast)- 
which take as given the member of the pseudo-exchange  rate union, 
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labeled country'  (France) and the country outside the union, labeled 
country**  (the United States). The model is therefore recursive. 
Because of the devaluations of the French franc mentioned earlier, 
a more accurate procedure would be to specify a three-tier, rather than 
a two-tier, structure. If the two large countries are the United States 
and Germany (as a proxy for the EMS) and France is treated as a small 
country, the recursiveness of the model is preserved. The structure of 
the monetary union between two (very) small countries would allow 
them to trade with France and the two large countries, or at least one 
of them (the United States), but not with each other. This would again 
preserve the recursiveness of  the model, but there would be two ex- 
ogenous exchange rates: the franc-dollar rate and the franc-Ecu rate 
shocking the (very) small economies. To illustrate the interaction be- 
tween France and the UMOA, though, a three-tier structure would be 
too cumbersome. 
The four national economies are described by conventional aggregate 
relationships. Demand for domestic output (the IS curve) is a function 
of foreign outputs, relative prices or the real exchange rate, and the 
real interest rate. It can be changed by an exogenous demand distur- 
bance, which  can also be interpreted  as the result  of  fiscal policy. 
Demand for real balances  (the LM curve) is a function of  domestic 
output and the nominal interest rate as a measure of the return differ- 
ential. Eliminating the nominal interest rate yields an aggregate demand 
curve that relates domestic output to the real exchange rate, to foreign 
output, and to the exogenous demand and monetary disturbances. A 
real depreciation increases the demand for domestic output along con- 
ventional foreign trade multiplier lines. 
The supply of domestic output is derived from labor market equilib- 
rium, in which the supply of  labor by workers responds to the wage 
deflated by a consumer price index, and the demand for labor by firms 
responds to the wage deflated by the price of the domestic good. Elim- 
inating the nominal wage yields an aggregate  supply curve  relating 
domestic output to the real exchange rate and to an exogenous supply 
disturbance that can be interpreted as a change in productivity. A real 
depreciation lowers the supply of domestic output because it raises the 
product wage. Prices change as a proportion of the difference between 
demand  and supply, so that a Phillips curve allowing for real wage 
rigidity is featured. 
The model is closed by the assumption that domestic and foreign 
assets are perfect  substitutes, so that interest rates are equalized in 
the  stationary  state. This recursively determines the  real  exchange 
rate and the price of domestic output in terms of the exogenous real 
and monetary disturbances, respectively. Under flexible exchange rates, 
the nominal exchange rate  is then given by monetary disturbances, 337  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
whereas  under fixed rates,  the nominal money  stock is determined 
endogenously. 
Size does not affect the interest-rate elasticities of money demand 
and aggregate demand, which are common to all four countries. It may 
affect the other parameters, which are, however, identical in each pair 
of large and small countries. In particular, the steady-state money stocks 
in the two small countries are the same. These assumptions could be 
somewhat relaxed, but an analytical solution does require some sym- 
metry between economic  structure^.^ 
The assumptions of labor market equilibrium and of perfect substi- 
tutability between domestic and foreign assets are particularly strong. 
Nevertheless, the case of an infinitely elastic supply of labor has often 
been used in the context of developing countries. The exchange rate 
union, on the other hand, rules out some special risks attached to the 
assets of small countries, making the perfect substitutability assump- 
tion slightly more palatable but the comparison with a perfectly flexible 
exchange rate regime less appropriate. Indeed, imperfect asset substi- 
tutability, as recognized by Marston (1985), would seem to call for the 
three-tier structure discussed earlier. 
The model is used below to assess the effect of  fixing the bilateral 
exchange rates of the two small countries with one of the large coun- 
tries. Under price flexibility the exchange rate regime has no effect on 
the real exchange rate, since the effect on the nominal exchange rate 
and the price level offset each other. Nevertheless, a monetary union 
between one of the large countries and the two small countries may 
require a transfer from the large partner to offset internal and external 
disturbances. To  that extent the union allows the central bank of the 
small countries to enforce an asymmetric monetary  allocation  rule. 
Prices then will not be adjusted to the nominal exchange rate, and the 
real exchange rate will also have to change as a consequence of the 
price rigidity. 
10.2.2  Flexible Exchange Rates 
The Two Large Economies 
I present the model here in logarithmic deviations from the stationary 
state and denote rates of change by dots. Assuming perfect foresight 
about prices and exchange rates, the model of the two large economies 




y* = uy** + ae* - b(i' -  $)  + U; 
y** = uy* - ae* - b(i" -  $*  + U: 
(3)  0'  = e  + p"  -  p*  the real exchange rate 338  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
consumer price indexes  I 
LM equations  i 
price adjustment rules 
interest parity 
(8)  $ = y(y* + kpe* -  u:) 
(9)  $8  = y(y** - kpe* - u:*) 
(10)  i'  = i'* + e, 
where yj is the real output of countryj (j = *,**); 
pj is the price of the output of country j; 
e is the price of the double-starred currency in units of the starred 
currency ; 
ij is the nominal interest rate in country j; 
ujA  is a demand disturbance in countryj; 
uj, is a supply disturbance in countryj; 
uj, is a monetary disturbance in countryj; 
u is the (common) foreign output multiplier; 
a is a (common) term involving trade elasticities divided by the 
multiplier; 
b  is  the  (common)  real  interest  semielasticity  of  aggregate 
demand; 
c is the (common) interest semielasticity of money demand; 
p is the (common) share of foreign goods in the consumer price 
indexes; 
y is the (common) speed of adjustment of domestic prices; and 
k  is the (common) real  exchange rate  elasticity of  aggregate 
supply. 
I will concentrate here on the stationary-state solution of the modeL4 
The real exchange rate is obtained from the difference in the cyclical 
positions of the two countries, whereas the interest rate is obtained by 
their sum. In other words, relative disturbances are channeled through 
the exchange rate; and global disturbances, through the interest rate, 
such that: 
where H. = a  + kp(1  + u); 
ud  = *u$ -  (1 + u)*u :is  a composite relative real disturbance; 339  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
us  = *uk -  (1 -  u)*u;  is a composite global real disturbance; 




The size of the multiplier H* is smaller, the larger the demand and 
supply elasticities a and k. Now, given O',  we can obtain y* and y"  by 
equating to zero the right-hand sides of equations (8) and (9), and we 
can obtain the price of domestic output from equations (6) and (7). 
Thus, in country**: 
(13)  p** =  -kpe* -  u::  + ci" + u; 
1  1 
= -  (kp*u;: + a*&)  + -  [*us -  (1  + 4 -  u)*u;]  + u;, 
H*  4 
where C$  = b/c.  The first term on the right-hand side of  the equation 
is a modified real exchange rate effect; the second term, a modified 
interest rate effect; and the third term, an own monetary effect. Note 
that the first term enters negatively in p'. 
Given prices and the real exchange rate, the nominal exchange rate 
is determined by equation (3). The interest rate effect drops out, so 
that again only relative disturbances matter, such that: 
(14)  e  = (1 + 2kp)e*  + 2*ud  m - 2*4 
(kp*u:: + a*u$, 
2  = e* +  - - 
H* 
Let us now consider the effect of each of  the disturbances in turn. 
Monetary disturbances have no effect on the real exchange rate and 
offsetting one-to-one effects on the nominal exchange rate and on the 
own price level. An increase in the demand for the good of country*, 
ul > 0, appreciates the real exchange rate by Y2H*. 
According to the first equation in (13), the effect of a change in the 
real exchange rate on the nominal exchange rate is augmented by 2kp 
because of the effect of aggregate demand  expansion in country* in 
raising prices in country**.  The real appreciation of the domestic cur- 
rency is always less than the nominal appreciation. 
Demand expansion in country"  increases the price level there by 
one half of ([l/4] - [kp/H.])  so that the nominal exchange rate depre- 
ciates by more, with the factor given by the effect of the real on the 
nominal exchange rate change, 1 + 243. The effect of supply or pro- 340  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
ductivity disturbances is also stronger on the nominal exchange rate, 
the difference being proportional to the trade elasticities. 
Equally distributed demand, supply, or monetary disturbances (such 
that  *up = 0 and  *u; = *uir  i = A, T,  m) leave the exchange rates 
unchanged (0* = e = 0). The size of  the effect of a supply shock on 
the price level differs from the size of that of a demand shock by the 
factor 1 + I$  -u, shown in the second term on the right-hand side of 
(13). Negatively correlated real disturbances (such that *uf  = 0 and 
*uf  = u;) leave interest rates unchanged (i' = i'* = 0). Their effect on 
the price level is given by the first term in equation (13). That effect 
vanishes when there are no supply effects (k = ui = 0). 
The structure of the large economies can thus be simplified by ruling 
out supply effects. If, in addition, their monetary policies are perfectly 
correlated (*u$ = 0) and there are only relative demand disturbances 
(*u:,  = 0), the nominal and real exchange rates are the same, and they 
will be the only channel of external disturbances to the small countries. 
The Two Small Economies 
The model of the small economies consists of the same relationships 
as in  the model  of  the large  economies.  Care is taken, though, to 
distinguish between trade with each of the two foreign countries, one 
of which, country*,  is a partner in the exchange rate union. I will present 
the model of what I will call the domestic economy in log-linear form, 
expressed again as a deviation from steady state. It will  be easy to 
modify the model to consider the other (identical) small country, which 




(18)  u,  -  p  = y - ci  LM equation 
(19) 
(20)  i = i'  + d  interest parity 
(21)  e'  = e"  - e,  triangular arbitrage, 
where  e'(e**)  is the price of  the starred (double starred) currency in 
units of the domestic currency; 
a*(a**)  is a term involving trade elasticities with country' (coun- 
try**)  divided by the multiplier; 
The following set of equations describes the domestic economy: 
y  = (a* + d*)e - a'6'  + u*y*  IS equation 
real exchange rate 
consumer price index 
+ w**y**  - b(i -  p,)  + UA 
0  = e"  + p"  - P 
p, = p  + (1 - a)@ - a*O* 
d = y[y - ha*O'  + h(l - a)€i - u,]  price adjustment rule 
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a*(@.*)  is the share of goods from country'  (country.')  in the 
consumer price index, a*  + a**  + CY  = 1; 
u*(u**)  is the multiplier for trade with country' (country**);  and 
h is the real exchange rate elasticity of aggregate supply. 
Concentrating again on a particular solution to the model (with bc = 
p = e'  = 0), we can solve for the real exchange rate, 8, as a function 
of the foreign real exchange rate, 8',  and the common interest rate, i'; 
supply disturbances in the two large countries; and domestic distur- 
bances, such that: 
(22)  H8 = [d* + (u' -  u**)kP]O*  + bi' -  U*U: -  u**u~,"  -  UA + u,, 
where dj = aj + haj, j = *,  **;  and H  = d'  + d**. 
are the same (u'  = u**  = u/2),  equation (22)  simplifies to: 
The role of trade patterns is apparent. Indeed, when trade multipliers 
(23)  H8 = d'8'  + *uA -  *US,  -  UA + u,. 
Even in this special case, global disturbances abroad affect the real 
exchange rate of the small countries unless they are the same as do- 
mestic disturbances (ui  = *u:, i = A,  IT). 
Substituting the right-hand side of (19) into (18) yields an expression 
for the price of domestic output in the same form as (13) above: 
(24) 
Substituting for  f3  yields in the strongly symmetric case of equation 
(23): 
(25)  p  = XA*  e* + -  + x(*ui - *u:) -  xuA - (1 - x) u,  + u,, 
where A* = (u*a.* - a**ct.)/(l - a)  and x = h(1 - a)/H 
If there is no difference between the relative shares of foreign output 
in  the domestic price  index and  the relative  trade elasticities, then 
A'  = 0. This is the case, emphasized by  Marston  (1984a), of  "bal- 
anced"  sensitivities. With equal real disturbances at home and abroad, 
the effect of a supply shock therefore differs from the effect of a demand 
shock by the same factor, 1 + 4) -  u,  as in equation (13) above. 
When foreign real disturbances are perfectly  negatively correlated 
and A'  = 0, the price of domestic output is a X-weighted average of 
demand and supply disturbances plus the monetary disturbance. From 
equation (18), then, output is given by: 
US 
4) 
(26)  Y  = XuA + (1 - x)  Uv. 342  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
Similarly, the real exchange rate can be written as: 
where 5  = a'/H = d(1  - a)  when A* = 0. 
To solve for the nominal exchange rate of the small country with the 
numeraire currency, use the definition of the real exchange rate, which 
is obtained by adding 8  and p in equations (25) and (27) and subtracting 
p"  in (13). In the absence of supply and interest-rate effects in the large 
countries, we find: 
(28)  e*'  = ce - U + u, - u,, 
where U = 5  uA + (1 -  5) u, and 5 = [l + h(l - a)l/H. 
To sum up the results under flexible exchange rates, monetary dis- 
turbances have no effect on the real exchange rate, and only domestic 
monetary disturbances  (u,)  have an effect on the price of domestic 
output (the effect is one-to-one, as before). An increase in the demand 
for domestic output (u,  > 0) appreciates the real exchange rate, and 
an increase in productivity (u, >  0) depreciates it by the same amount, 
1/H. 
In the two-country model the effect is not symmetric because account 
has to be taken of the output repercussion in the foreign country, which 
is zero for the small, open economy. Thus, in equation (1 1) the depre- 
ciation caused by a supply shock is larger than the appreciation caused 
by a demand shock by v/2H*. 
Another difference is the unambiguously negative effect of demand 
expansion on the domestic price level. Since the fall in prices induces 
a real depreciation, the nominal exchange rate has to appreciate by 
more than the real rate. The effect of the supply shock on prices is 
also unambiguously negative, but the nominal exchange rate will de- 
preciate only if the trade elasticities are small (a'  + a** < 1, or equiv- 
alently  5 > l), because in that case the fall in prices is less than the 
real depreciation. 
** 
10.2.3  Fixed Exchange Rates 
It is useful to define the effective  exchange rate  of  the domestic 
economy, a weighted average of the exchange rates of the two partners, 
by the weights given by the respective shares in the foreign component 
of the consumer price index, that is, by 5,  such that: 
(29)  E, = (e'  + (I -  5) e"  = e** - 5e. 
The second equation is obtained by triangular arbitrage. Taking it into 
account, we can see from equation (28) that in this simplified setting 343  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
the effective exchange rate is a function only of domestic disturbances. 
If the home country fixes its exchange rate with country.,  then e'  = 0 
and e"'  = e. We thus have the effective exchange rate under the union, 
denoted by a tilde, such that: 
(30)  EE  = (1 -  5) e. 
The effective exchange rate under the union appears in the expression 
for the exchange rate with the potential partner, obtained from (28) by 
triangular arbitrage, such that: 
(31) 
Under the union, equation (31) becomes an equation for the endogenous 
money stock of the home country, denoted by m,  such that: 
(32)  m  = uk  + E~  + U. 
Because of the difference in size between the two partners, however, 
the money stock of  country'  continues to be policy determined, and 
there is no problem of monetary allocation between the two partners. 
Thus, uR can be interpreted as an exogenous increase in the unionwide 
money stock. If  *u$ = 0, foreign monetary expansion increases the 
domestic money stock one-to-one, since there is no induced deprecia- 
tion of the exchange rate of country.. 
Associated with the money stock under the union is a price of do- 
mestic output, denoted by a tilde. From equation (25),  in the absence 
of global real disturbances and when sensitivities are balanced, we find: 
(33)  p  =  -y  + m. 
Since according to (26) and (27) y and 8 are given by real domestic 
disturbances, the difference between the fixed and flexible exchange 
rate solutions is matched by the difference in money stocks and prices, 
such that: 
(34) 
Equation (34) shows that if the fixed exchange rate is lower than the 
one prevailing before the agreement, the money stock and the price of 
domestic output will decrease by the same amount. The decrease in 
the money  stock is brought  about by  a capital outflow that would 
increase in magnitude  if  the government attempted  to increase  the 
supply of  domestic assets to the public. As long as real output does 
not change, the real money stock remains fixed, and the fall in money 
balances is transmitted to prices. Only by increasing demand for real 
output could the government enforce a different nominal income. Al- 
ternatively,  as we will see, the loss in reserves could be offset by a 
transfer from abroad. 
e'  =  -(1  - 5)e - U + u,  -  uk. 
e - e"  =p  -p  = m - urn. 344  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
In general, the price of domestic output has to be different from its 
equilibrium level for the real exchange rate to be different under the 
union. For example, domestic prices may be downwardly rigid. 
Consider, thus, a price level pT  associated with a real exchange rate 
8, which under the union gives a real exchange rate  The difference 
in real exchange rates then equals the difference in nominal rates, so 
that, from equation (34): 
(35) 
The difference between the price prevailing in the neutral situation 
of equation (33) and that prevailing in the rigid situation can be de- 
composed further into the difference  in  real outputs and in  money 
stocks. The latter, in turn, can derive from an increase in the foreign 
money stock. Assuming that *u$ = 0, denoting the common increase 
by Urn, and that 8 = 0 under the “neutral” union (that is, u,  = u,  = 0), 
we find: 
T.  0T - 0  = p -  p 
(36)  p -  PT = m - mT  -  y  YT 
where mT  is given by equation (32) with U  = tu$ and uk  = Urn. A 
demand expansion, uz, perhaps in the form of a fiscal expansion, ap- 
preciates the real exchange rate by  l/H,  whereas a monetary transfer 
from abroad has a one-to-one effect. 
When account is taken of the induced real appreciation, the demand 
expansion increases  output  by  x < 1.  Given  monetary policy, this 
expansion would reduce prices by the same amount by which it expands 
output, so that  the nominal appreciation would be given by  x +  I/ 
H  = 6. Ruling  out the exchange rate change  and the fall in prices 
requires an increase in the money stock by the same factor 6, which 
will be less than one if  the trade elasticities are high enough. The real 
appreciation is accompanied by a rise in prices in the amount 1/H. To 
keep the nominal  exchange rate constant, demand expansion must 
therefore be consistent with the increase in the money stock, or uA = 
lzrn/6. Of the equivalent rise in nominal income, a proportion, x/E, goes 
to real output expansion, and the remainder, (1 -  x)/[, goes to the rise 
in prices and fall in the real exchange rate. 
In sum, the effects of a fixed exchange rate regime are confined to 
nominal variables unless there is a price rigidity, an induced demand 
for domestic output as a consequence of fiscal expansion, or a transfer 
from abroad. The last possibility is particularly relevant when there is 
a monetary union involving the two small countries, henceforth indexed 
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10.2.4  Two-Tier Monetary Unions 
A Monetary Union  of  Two Small Countries 
If country  1 fixes its exchange rate with country 2, e; will equal e; 
in equation (31). Unlike in  the previous case, we must keep track of 
the monetary allocation. In fact, any exogenous increase in the union- 
wide money stock, denoted by  t, will be allocated between the two 
partners in proportion to their steady-state shares (assumed to be equal). 
Setting a,  = 0 for simplicity, we find: 
(37)  rnl = t + Ud 
(38)  m2 = t - Ud 
(39)  e'  = t -  (1 - ()e - Us, 
where t is the increase in the unionwide money stock; Ud  = (Ul - 
U2)/2;  and Us = (U' + U2)/2. 
Given the unchanged real exchange rates, equations (37) through (39) 
are the solution of the exchange rate union between two small coun- 
tries.  If  t = 0, the money  stocks are unchanged  when demand and 
supply disturbances are perfectly  correlated (Ud = 0). In that case, 
the exchange rate with country* appreciates by  Us = U'. 
A Three-Country Monetary Union 
In general, fixing the exchange rate with country* requires an in- 
crease in the unionwide money stock given by making e'  = 0 in equa- 
tion (39). If real disturbances are exogenous, the transfer must adjust. 
Denoting this endogenous monetary transfer from abroad by a tilde, 
we find: 
(40)  i=E,+u". 
According to equation (40), a depreciation of the franc against the 
dollar requires an increase in  that is larger, the higher the consumption 
share of goods from country**  relative to goods from country*  (the lower 
the 5). On the other hand, a unionwide demand expansion requires an 
increase in ithat  is larger, the larger the consumption share of nonunion 
relative to union goods (the lower the a). 
The endogenous increase in the unionwide money stock (i  > 0) can 
be interpreted as a transfer from the large partner that guarantees the 
fixed exchange rate agreement. Although t could be zero in equations 
(37) through (39),  will generally be nonzero in (40). 
Conversely, the transfer  may  remain  exogenous if  expenditure  is 
adjusted by fiscal policy in both countries, such that (with ui = 0): 
(41)  a2  = (t - -%)I.& 346  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
I continue to assume that the transfer has no effect on the money 
stock of  country’ because of the size difference. It is, nevertheless, 
required by the union and would be zero only if there were no unionwide 
demand or supply disturbances and no external real disturbances either, 
so that V = e = 0. 
I will analyze next how the allocation of the transfer can have real 
effects. 
A Monetary Allocation Rule 
If the unionwide central bank allocates the transfer in equation (40) 
according to (37) and (38), the full monetary union will have no real 
effects. This is easy to verify by eliminating t  = I. 
Consider now a monetary allocation rule whereby money increases 
in each country, denoted as u$, are based on a share w of the sum of 
the equilibrium money stock increases. The percentage change in each 
money stock is given by 2wi when the two small countries are identical 
in steady state, so that: 
(42)  u$- = 2wt 
(43) 
Using equations (40), and (42),  and (43)  in (39,  we find: 
(44) 
(45) 
u+ = 2(1 -  w)i. 
ef = el + (1 - 24~6  + (1 - w)ul  - wu2 
eT  = e2 - (I - 24  “6  -  (1 - w)u*  + @u2. 
The effects of various disturbances on Of are displayed in table 10.1. 
Since the exchange rate gaps are of the same magnitude and of opposite 
sign (if  0:  > 8,, then  0;  < e2>,  the results for country 2 are easy to 
obtain.  Thus  the  first column, first  row  shows that  the  effect  of  a 
depreciation of the franc-dollar rate is ambiguous when w > Yz. The 
effect will be a real depreciation in the small countries if  trade is suf- 
ficiently biased toward France. When w  = V2, the effect is the same 
as under flexible exchange rates. 
The first column, second row shows that demand expansion in coun- 
try  1 has an ambiguous effect on the real exchange rate, unless the 
whole transfer goes to country 2 (w  = 0),  in which case the effect will 
be positive.  The condition for a negative effect will be weaker than 
w > Yz if the supply elasticity is high enough, that is, if  h(1 - a)  > 1. 
When the entire transfer goes to the expanding country (w  = l), the 
effect is the same as in equation (27) above. 
The effect of demand expansion in country 2 is a real appreciation 
in country  1, and the same is true of a productivity  improvement if 
trade elasticities are high enough (6 < 1). As shown in the third row, 
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Table 10.1  The Effect of Disturbances on the Real Exchange Rate of  Country 
1(0f) 
Disturbance 
Demand  Supply 
(j  = A)  (j  = a)  Both 
1.  Foreign (e)  a.  + a-(l  -  20)  n.a.  ma. 
I-a 
2.  Domestic (uj)  x -  -we  I-x-o(l-~)  I-w 
3.  Partner (uj)  -  0s  -41 -  5)  --w 
4.1 Global (ui = uj)  x -  2-wl  1-x-20(1-[)  1-2w 
4.2  Distribution (u; = u:)  X  1-X  1 
4.  Unionwide 
transfer goes to country 2 (w  = 0). The effect of a domestic produc- 
tivity improvement is an unambiguous real depreciation, so that a har- 
vest failure (ut, < 0), for example, causes the real exchange rate to fall. 
When the entire transfer goes to country 1 (w  = I), the effect is again 
the same as in equation (27). 
As shown in the fourth rows, the effects of unionwide global dis- 
turbances are the same as in (27) when w  = Yz. On the contrary, in- 
versely correlated disturbances are independent of w and always have 
an effect given by x.  In general, the real exchange rate gap can be 
avoided by the choice of a suitable w. For example, if  U' > u2,  then 
w > Y2  for 0;  = Bi. 
The model described above shows how a monetary allocation rule 
induces a change in the real exchange rates of the members of a mon- 
etary union. This description implies that there is also a pseudo-exchange 
rate union that includes, aside from the members of the monetary union, 
a large country ready to ensure the fixed exchange rate agreement by 
transferring real resources to the union. 
Because of the size difference between the partners, an increase in 
the large partner's money stock could also imply a change in the real 
exchange rate of  the small partner, to the extent that the price level 
was different from the one to which the exchange rate was pegged. 
Similarly, the real effects of demand expansion could be interpreted in 
terms of a fiscal expansion induced by the union, as long as the large 
partner is willing to transfer real resources and therefore increase real 
money balances. 
Nevertheless, the focus of the analysis was on the allocation of  a 
given transfer between  the two  small countries, because  this is an 348  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
important feature in the recent experience of the West African Mon- 
etary Union. The major implication of the model was therefore that 
changes in the real exchange rate of the small partners are to be ex- 
pected when the allocation of a given transfer is different from the one 
implied by the assumed equality of the steady-state monetary shares 
of the two small countries. 
10.3  The West African Monetary Union 
10.3.1  The Franc Zone 
Established in the mid-1940s between France and its colonies, the 
Franc Zone  survived the independence of  the colonies in the early 
1960s and the move to generalized floating exchange rates in the early 
1970s. 
Summing up the African monetary experience of the Bretton Woods 
era, Mundell (1972,  93)  wrote: 
The French and the English economic traditions in monetary theory 
and history are different. At the risk of gross oversimplification . . . 
the French tradition has  stressed the passive nature of  monetary 
policy and the importance of  exchange stability with convertibility 
(within the franc area); stability  was  achieved at the expense of 
institutional  development  and  monetary  experience.  The  British 
countries by opting for monetary independence have sacrificed sta- 
bility, but gained experience and better developed monetary insti- 
tutions. The simplest test of  this is the extent of development of 
money substitutes. 
Mundell went on to present indicators of financial intermediation for 
eleven “rich countries” and 33  African countries, classified into “Franc 
Africa,” “Sterling Africa,” “North Africa,” and “Central East Africa.” 
His figures showed that in  1968 the median propensity to hold cash 
was 21 percent in OECD countries, 33 percent in Sterling Africa, 47 
percent in Franc Africa, and 45  percent in the other two regions of 
Africa. 
Table  10.2 provides evidence along the same lines for the United 
States and France, as rich countries; Kenya, a Sterling Africa country; 
several countries of  Franc Africa; Barbados, a member of the East 
Caribbean Currency Area; and Sudan.5 The figures for 1962 and 1972 
confirm the lower development of money substitutes in Franc Africa. 
The Franc Zone has changed considerably over the last 40 years. 
Upon independence, it was adapted through the creation of common 
central banks for the former French colonies of West, Central, and 
East Africa. In particular, Benin, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Sen- 
egal, Togo, and Upper Volta created UMOA, managed by the Central 349  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
Table 10.2  Indicators of Financial Intermediation in Various Countries, in 
Percentages 
Propensity to Hold Near-Money  Propensity to Hold Cash 
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Bank of the West African States (known by its French abbreviation 
BCEAO), whereas Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Congo, and Ga- 
bon established the union of the members of the Bank of Central African 
States. The members of those two monetary unions signed an agree- 
ment of monetary cooperation with France whereby the exchange rate 
between the French franc and the franc of African Financial Cooper- 
ation (CFA) was fixed, foreign exchange reserves were pooled, and 
exchange controls were common to the whole zone. Most importantly, 
an “operations account” at the French Treasury guaranteed the con- 
vertibility of the CFA and provided a channel for monetary transfers 
between France and UMOA. 
Although Mali participated in the UMOA negotiations, it refused to 
sign the agreement and left the Franc Zone in  1962. Its justification 
was consistent with Mundell’s view of the British tradition: Monetary 350  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
sovereignty, Mali argued, was an essential instrument of development. 
Monetary stability ws a less pressing consideration. 
Mali’s criticism of the Franc Zone as a neocolonial obstacle to “self- 
centered”  development is  only one example of  a fairly widespread 
view that  the arrangement has served to benefit France.6 Since the 
repeated  devaluation of the French franc after  1981 and the imple- 
mentation of  tighter areawide exchange controls, the desirable trend 
toward trade diversification away from  France  seems to have been 
reversed. As a consequence, the British tradition might now provide 
an argument for leaving the Franc Zone: There will be no monetary 
stability in the UMOA if  there is none in France. 
This controversy  about the costs and benefits of the Franc Zone 
arrangements merely illustrates how the volatility of  major exchange 
rates over the last ten years has changed the terms of the Mundellian 
trade-off between monetary stability and development. Stability rela- 
tive to one currency means instability relative to other floating curren- 
cies, so that fixing “the”  exchange rate is no longer an option. The 
figures for  1982 reported in table  10.2 also suggest a blurring of the 
difference between  the French and the English monetary traditions. 
Certainly, the propensity to hold cash remains higher in the former 
French colonies than in  Kenya, but except for Madagascar, the pro- 
pensity to hold near-money increased much faster in the countries of 
Franc Africa than it did in Kenya or Sudan. 
To the extent that both groups were subject to the global shocks of 
the 1970s, the acceleration of financial development casts the agree- 
ments of monetary cooperation with France in a new light. The orig- 
inality of their design has been emphasized in the work of the Guillau- 
monts  (1984).  Rather  than  being a  historic  relic,  the  Franc  Zone 
represents in their view a conscious choice of monetary and exchange 
rate policy by  sovereign states. Similarly, for Vinay (1980, 3), it is a 
“unique organization in which the traditional legalism of  French in- 
stitutions was replaced by a fertile pragmatism.”  The fact that some 
former French colonies, such as Madagascar and Mauritania, left the 
union in 1972 is, of course, consistent with the idea of ~hoice.~ 
Pragmatism can also be found in the posture of Mali. Three years 
after choosing monetary  sovereignty,  Mali began  negotiations  for a 
return to the Franc Zone, and a special arrangement was agreed upon 
in 1967 whereby the Malian franc was devalued by 50 percent relative 
to the CFA. In addition, France was to lobby for the accession of Mali 
to the UMOA. The agreement involved two preliminary phases. A one- 
year fiscal adjustment-cum-liberalization was followed by bilateral co- 
operation with France along BCEAO lines. The duration of this phase 
was not specified, since full membership for Mali might not in the end 
be welcome by the other members. This is not surprising in light of 351  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
the country’s singular monetary underdevelopment, apparent from ta- 
ble 10.2, and its persistently negative operations account with France. 
Political considerations also played  a role,  as emphasized by  Crum 
(1984). 
Nevertheless, Malian membership in the UMOA was agreed upon 
in Niamey, Niger in October 1983. The third phase was thus completed 
in  1984. Because of the increasing transfer of  resources from France 
to the UMOA, the reversal of Mali’s position might be explained by a 
desire to receive the transfer through the UMOA rather than directly 
from France. 
If fixing is impossible in a world of floating rates and a pure float is 
not a viable-let  alone desirable-option for a developing country, an 
alternative to the institutions of the Franc Zone would be for the UMOA 
collectively to peg to a basket of currencies.  This was proposed by 
Nascimento (1984) on the basis of his econometric analysis of the costs 
and benefits of various exchange rate regimes for the union as a whole. 
He measured the trade-off between monetary sovereignty and the “li- 
quidity” by, respectively, the loss in reserves associated with an excess 
supply of money (the offset coefficient) and the variances of departures 
from purchasing power parity. According to this operationalization of 
the  Mundellian trade-off,  offset  coefficients and real  exchange rate 
variability in the UMOA are smallest under a basket peg and largest 
under a crawling peg relative to the French franc. 
Both the neglect of the French transfer-which  allows the continued 
sterilization of the loss in reserves-and  the assumption of purchasing 
power parity cast doubt on the applicability of Nascimento’s analysis 
to the UMOA, let alone to its members with persistent deficits, such 
as Senegal. All the same, for a given transfer, pegging to a basket allows 
for the choice of optimal weights. Since it is unlikely for the optimal 
weight of a particular currency to be one, such a regime would dominate 
the present arrangement. Similarly, it is unlikely that the rate of crawl 
would be  zero, so  that a regime by  which indicators are optimally 
chosen will also dominate the basket peg.8 This arrangement would 
make the UMOA look like the EMS rather than part of the Franc Zone. 
The problem for a deficit country in the UMOA would then be how to 
ensure a continued transfer from its surplus partners, if there are any. 
10.3.2  Monetary Allocations in the UMOA 
During its first decade the UMOA followed the prudent course cited 
earlier as being characteristic of the French monetary tradition. From 
its Paris headquarters, BCEAO managed to keep the composition of 
the union’s money stock (M2) virtually constant. The net foreign assets 
of the banking system grew almost without interruption and remained 
at about one third  of  the money  stock, so  that domestic assets ac- 352  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
counted for the other two thirds, as shown in table  10.3, column 3. 
The propensity to hold near-money increased from 4 percent in  1962 
to  13 percent  ten  years later (column 4). Finally, as a share of the 
French money  stock, the UMOA's  money  showed a slight increase 
over that period (column 5). 
The situation changed in the 1970s, but the reversal was obscured 
by  the drastic increases in the reserves of Ivory Coast in  1974 and 
1977, largely as the result of higher world prices for coffee (19 percent 
and 20 percent, respectively) and cocoa (56 percent and 69 percent, 
respectively). The reserves of Togo also jumped in 1974 as the result 
of a rise in the price of phosphates (by 483 percent); and as a share of 
the union money stock they went from 14 percent to 27 percent. At 
the same time the institutional reforms allowed the BCEAO greater 
freedom to conduct monetary policy from its newly established African 
headquarters .9 
Table 10.3  The Composition of Money Stock in the UMOA, 1962-82 
Net Foreign  Money  Ratio  Ratio Time  Share of 
Assets  (M2)  (1)/(2)  Deposits/(Z)  France 
(CFAF billion)  (%) 
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Sources: (1) IFS line 31n summed over country pages; it excludes long-term borrowing 
(line 36cl) and SDR allocations (included in other items, line 37r). 
(2) ZFS  lines 34 and 35 summed over country pages. 
(4) IFS line 35 divided by (2). 
(5) (2) plus (3) divided by IFS lines 34 plus 35 for France. 353  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
As shown in table  10.4, the negative foreign asset position of the 
commercial banks overtook the claims of the central bank in 1979, and 
the operations account of the central bank moved from a claim of CFAF 
54.6 million on France in  December 1979 to a liability of  CFAF 13.2 
million in March 1980. The steep increases in the reserves of Togo in 
1981  and  1982 were no longer sufficient to offset the declines of  the 
two major partners, Ivory Coast and Senegal. The external liabilities 
of  the banking system increased from 10 percent of the money stock 
in December 1979 to 36  percent in June 1982 and reached 56 percent 
in June 1983. 
Put in another way, domestic assets increased from 96 percent of the 
union money stock in 1978 to 143 percent in 1982. In the meantime the 
domestic assets of  France fell from  82 percent  to 69 percent of the 
money stock in 1980 and increased to 77 percent in 1981 and 1982. This 
change reflected the loss of foreign exchange reserves associated with 
the expected devaluations of the franc during those two years (and 
thus offset the revaluation of  existing resources). 
The evolution of the shares of UMOA members in the union’s money 
stock (M2) is summarized in table 10.5. Measured by the coefficient 
of  variation, the Senegalese share was the second most stable, but it 
was the most unstable over the entire period 1962-82. Of the two largest 
shares, the share of  Ivory Coast has been positively correlated with 
the UMOA share in the French money stock, whereas the correspond- 
ing correlation for Senegal has been negative.  During the 1960s the 
Table 10.4  The Net Foreign Assets of the UMOA, 1975-83  (CFAF billion) 
Assets of  Liabilities of 
the Central  the Commercial 
Bank  Banks  [(I)  - (2)l 
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-  99.0 
-309.7 
-  427.9 
-  560.5 
-434.5 
-713.3 
Source; BCEAO (includes long-term borrowing and SDR allocations that are excluded 
in the IFS presentation of table 10.3). 
Nores: The totals in column (3) may not add due to rounding. The figures in (2) represent 
new series since 1979. The June  1983 figure in (3) excludes Benin (data not available). 354  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
converse was true (- .55 for Ivory Coast and .62 for Senegal, as re- 
ported in Macedo 1985a). For the last few years Senegal’s allocation 
was therefore insulated from the decline of the total. 
That the insulation was on average at the expense of Ivory Coast is 
suggested by the negative correlation of .8 between the two monetary 
allocations, shown in table 10.6. The strength of the inverse link be- 
tween the two economies was even higher in the 1960s (over the years 
1962-72  the correlation reached -  .99),  largely because of  the deteri- 
oration  of  the Ivorian  external  position  after  1980.’O If  the  French 
transfer decreases, however,  the negative  shares correlation will  in- 
crease again. 
The increase in UMOA money relative to French money has reversed 
in the last few years, as France has grown reluctant to replenish the 
operations account on a continuing basis. This implies that in the future 
the monetary allocation of  the transfer will become a central policy 
issue for the members of the UMOA. The membership of Mali, another 
country with a structural deficit, is also likely to tighten the constraint 
on the shares. 
Table 10.5  Summary Statistics of Members’ Shares in the UMOA Money 
Stock, 1973-82,  in Percentages 
Coefficient 
Country  Mean  of Variation  Correlation 
Ivory Coast  58  (54)  6  (12)  .33  (.37) 
Togo  7  (7)  14  (19)  .24  (.43) 
Niger  6  (6)  18  (14)  .26  (.06) 
Upper Volta  5  (5)  9  (12)  -.44  (-.47) 
TotauFrance  1  (1)  17  (22)  1 .OO 
Senegal  19  (22)  8  (29)  -.72  (-.37) 
Benin  5  (6)  18  (14)  p.42  (-.46) 
Source: IFS, lines 34 and 35. 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses refer to data for 1962-82. The coefficient of variation 
is the standard deviation divided by the mean (times 100). 
Table 10.6  Correlations of Monetary Allocations, 1973-82 
Ivory Coast  Senegal  Togo  Niger  Benin 
Senegal  -  .76( -  .96) 
Togo  -  .71(.60)  .41(-.76) 
Niger  -.52(-.24)  -.10(.02)  .52(.  20) 
Benin  .78( -  .65)  .60(.  5 1)  .24( -  .27)  .24(.21) 
Upper Volta  -  .82( -  38)  .65(  .81)  .27( -  .58)  .34(.31)  .84(.66) 
Source: Same data as in table  10.5. 
Note:  The numbers in parentheses refer to 1962-82. 355  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
10.3.3  Nominal Stability and Real Volatility 
Table  10.7 lists the 1980 trade shares of France, Senegal, and the 
other African countries covered in table 10.2 by loosely defined Ecu 
and dollar areas. The shares of the Franc Zone (including France) and 
of the United States are also indicated. The non-U.S.  members of the 
dollar area are obtained residually. 
Ivory Coast, Madagascar, and Mali show a lower share for imports 
from the dollar area than Senegal. Their share of  imports from the 
United States is similar to that of  Mauritania, Cameroon, and Mada- 
gascar. The Franc Zone export share is highest in Senegal, followed 
by Mauritania, Mali, and Ivory Coast. On the import side, however, 
Senegal has the lowest share among Franc Zone countries. Thus, trade 
diversification increased the dollar-area share in the trade of the Franc 
Zone countries, but, as mentioned earlier, the trend has probably been 
reversed in recent years." 
Because  of  the  different  trade  patterns,  there  are sizable differ- 
ences  between  the  nominal  effective  exchange rate  of  France  and 
Table 10.7  Trade Shares by  Currency Area, 1980, in Percentages 
Of which  Of  Which 





























































































Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of  Trade (Washington, D.C.). 
Nores: The numbers in parentheses indicate the minimum share; for example, for Senegal 
all partners with a one percent share or larger were included in the computation. Except 
for the United States, the dollar area is obtained residually. The data on French shares 
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those  of  the  Franc  Zone  countries.  In  the  1970s changes  in  the 
effective  exchange  rate  of  the  U.S.  dollar  have  also  become  an 
important  source of divergence. Thus, the mean annual rate of  de- 
preciation  over the  1973-82  period  was  2.5 percent  for  France,  1 
percent  for Ivory  Coast,  and  zero  for  Senegal, using  1980  import 
weights.  With export weights,  there was no change for the UMOA 
countries and a 2 percent per annum change for France. The standard 
deviation  was  also lower  for the  UMOA  countries, but  relative  to 
the  mean  their  nominal  effective  rates  were  more  volatile  than 
France’s, as shown in table  10.8. 
After a decade of experience with flexible exchange rates, the notion 
that real exchange rates would be stabilized by the offsetting of nominal 
variations by inflation differentials, very popular in the mid-1970s has 
been  abandoned  even by  its most ardent defenders.  The failure  of 
purchasing power parity is evident in the substantial variability of most 
measures of real effective exchange rates in the industrialized coun- 
tries.12 Data availability precluded  the  computation of  effective  ex- 
change rates using more  narrowly  based  indexes than the so-called 
African consumer price index or even correcting prices for exchange 
rate changes.13 
Table 10.8  Nominal and Real Exchange Rates, 1973-82 
Coefficient of 
Mean (% p.a.)  Variation  Correlations 
Between Nominal 
Nominal  Real  Nominal  Real  and Real 
Export Weights 
Ivory Coast  .32 
Cameroon  1.95 
Madagascar  2.84 
Mauritania  -  1.61 
Sudan  11.19 
Senegal  .36 
France  1.70 
Kenya  -  2.08 
-  1.92 
-  .24 
-  .96 
-  .64 
3.28 











3.18  .63 
26.04  32 
5.78  .I0 
14.95  .96 
4.39  .82 
5.36  .90 
7.83  .70 
5.12  .96 
Import Weights 
Ivory Coast  1.11  -1.51  2.85  4.16  .62 
Cameroon  1.37  -  .41  1.72  7.41  .57 
Madagascar  1.91  -1.32  2.14  4.08  -.I9 
Mauritania  -  1.76  -1.13  3.66  8.52  .98 
Sudan  11.43  3.44  1.60  4.33  .87 
Kenya  4.26  .87  .90  5.24  .33 
Senegal  .I6  1.69  28.13  5.60  .77 
France  2.54  1.44  2.28  5.53  .86 
Source: IFS, with weights as described in Macedo (1985a). 357  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
The evolution of real effective exchange rates in table 10.8 shows 
Senegal and  France as the  only  French-speaking countries  to have 
depreciated in real terms. In terms of real variability, Senegal was also 
close to France (6), with Mauritania the highest (E),  and Ivory Coast 
the lowest (4).  The mean changes are close in absolute values, but the 
correlation between nominal and real changes is lower in Ivory Coast. 
Furthermore, the correlation between the real rates in the two countries 
increased to .45 in the 1970s. 
Figure 10.1 shows a real depreciation of the franc since 1968 and pro- 
nounced swings around the upward trend, which are most pronounced 
when the 1981 weights are used. It is also evident from the figure that 
after 1976 Senegal moved opposite to France, whereas Ivory Coast mag- 
nified the French movement. There was a substantial gap between the 
real rates of the two partners until 1980, as would be expected from the 
automatic adjustment mechanism of the balance of payments. This sug- 
gests that the monetary allocation rule did respond to the external per- 
formance of the economies, particularly  when the total share of the 
UMOA ceased to increase in relation to the French money stock.  l4 
75 
I  I  1 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1982 
Fig. 10.1  Real effective exchange rate indices (1980 import weights). 
Source: Same as table 10.8. 358  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
10.4  Conclusion 
Although there are few monetary unions, there are many  models 
thereof. Most of those models are concerned with the choice of a single 
country to peg to a single currency. The case analyzed in this paper is 
even more unusual because it involves a collection of countries pegging 
to a single currency. Nevertheless, an effort was made to analyze the 
workings of a full monetary union that has been in existence for about 
four decades. 
The theoretical model presented in section 10.2 focused on the in- 
teraction of two small and two large countries and showed under what 
conditions the monetary union would imply changes in the real ex- 
change rates of its members. A transfer of real resources from the large 
partner was an especially relevant case, since this is what has happened 
in the last few years with the UMOA and France. 
Building on the available studies of the institutional structure of the 
UMOA, section 10.3 described the process of monetary allocation. The 
drastic deterioration of  the net foreign asset position of  the UMOA 
over the last five years shows the importance of the French transfer. 
Over the last 20 years, however, monetary allocation within the union 
was associated with a very high negative correlation between the two 
major partners, Senegal and Ivory Coast. To the extent that the transfer 
from France disappears, a fixed exchange rate with the French franc 
will require a restoration of this pattern rather than the growing union- 
wide deficit that has been observed since 1979. 
The comparison of the interaction between exchange rate and relative 
price changes in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and'France confirmed the ex- 
pected failure of purchasing power parity to stabilize the real exchange 
rate. More surprising4espite the presence in the price index used of 
nontraded goods and goods whose prices are controlled-was  the in- 
sulation of (African) consumer price inflation in the UMOA from French 
consumer price inflation. The stability of the nominal effective rates in 
the UMOA was therefore accompanied by unstable real effective ex- 
change rates. Since this relative price is only weakly positively cor- 
related with the terms of trade, it can be said that the monetary union 
achieved nominal stability at the expense of real volatility. The unfor- 
tunate consequences of  this pattern for resource allocation led Nas- 
cimento (1983) to propose a basket peg for the UMOA. But his argument 
ignores the increasing French transfer of the last four years. 
The comparison of the real effective exchange rates of Senegal and 
Ivory Coast with several other African countries confirms the singu- 
larity of the Senegalese experience. All the rates depreciated in nominal 
terms, but Senegal achieved a real depreciation during the floating rate 
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terms. Real exchange rate variability over the sample period was less 
pronounced in Madagascar, Mauritania, and Sudan. 
This comparison suggests that if the loss of monetary autonomy did 
not induce a gold-standard type of  adjustment to external inflation in 
Senegal (as it did in Ivory Coast before 1980), the reason is to be found 
in the increase of the unionwide money stock relative to the exoge- 
nously determined French money stock in the 1970s. More important, 
from 1975 to 1980, if the monetary allocation rule allowed Ivory Coast 
to drain money from Senegal through the balance of payments, it would 
have induced real appreciation in the former country and real depre- 
ciation in the latter, as was indeed observed. 
Needless to say, this paper merely scratches the surface of the prob- 
lem of choosing an exchange rate regime for the members of the UMOA 
and for developing countries in general. The model does not capture 
enough stylized features of  the small African economies, and much 
more work needs to be done on characterizing them empirically. Some 
features of the large industrialized economies were also left out, es- 
pecially the effect of the changes in the franc-Ecu rate. 
Finally, the model suggested an exogenous administrative procedure 
to determine the crucial monetary allocation parameter. The effect of 
the recent threat of a reduction in the transfer from France is therefore 
likely  to be increasing conflicts about the monetary allocation  rule, 
making it endogenous. A model like the one presented in section 10.2 
can, of course, be extended to incorporate some of these conflicts. 
Notes 
1.  Since the survey by Tower and Willet  (1976), there have been contributions by 
Allen and Kenen (1980), Aoki (1983), Marston (1984a; 1985). Melitz (1984), and Huizinga 
(1984), among others. On exchange rate policy in developing countries, see Lewis (1977) 
and Kenen (1978). 
2. See Macedo (1983) for a two-country model along the same lines and Marston 
(1984b) for a discussion of supply effects. The model used here is a simplified version 
of that in Macedo (1985b). 
3.  It is possible to introduce further asymmetries by marginal changes in the param- 
eters, using the methodology developed by Aoki (1981). 
4. The homogeneous solution is in Macedo (1985b). 
5. The relationship between monetary and real integration in Africa is emphasized in 
Letiche (1972). On the West African experience, see McLenaghan, Nsouli, and Riechel 
(1982) and Robson (1983). Helleiner (1983) assessed the prospects for Africa’s relations 
with the International Monetary Fund. Note that since Sudan is in the Middle Eastern 
Department at the IMF, it is not included in IMF (1968-77). 
6. Raffinot  (1982) is one of  the most systematic attempts at defending this view.  It 
surfaces, however, in Mulumba (1976), cited almost approvingly by Connolly (1983). 
7. Indeed, Allen (1983) reviewed the institutional structure of the UMOA as part of 
the preparation for setting up the East Caribbean Central Bank. 360  Jorge Braga de Macedo 
8. See the analysis of Branson and Katseli (1982) and, on the choice of indicators, 
Branson and Macedo (1982). 
9.  Bhattia (1982) emphasized  the importance of the  1974 reform in his study of the 
UMOA up to that date. The need for a more active interest rate policy is clear from 
Leite (1982). 
10.  Djscreetly, the 1980 report of the BCEAO assigned the responsibility for the decline 
to “un Etat membre de 1’Union” (p. 45). 
1 1.  The use of export and import shares to measure the relative importance of trading 
partners’ currencies neglects the growing weight of services and interest. In the case of 
Senegal the current-account shares are not very different from the ones reported in table 
10.7. See Macedo (1985a). 
12. Nascimento  (1984) and Connolly (1983) assumed  that purchasing  power parity 
holds between the UMOA and the EMS (or France). 
13. Plane (1983) compared the African index and the national output deflator. He also 
computed “synthetic indices of competitiveness” based on ratios of unit values as well 
as on average market  shares. Those indexes behave quite differently from the real ex- 
change rates. No real rates are reported here for Mali because the IFS lists no price 
index. Plane (1983) presented such an index and singled it out as showing a clear ov- 
ervaluation, unlike the other nine African currencies he studied. 
14.  The correlation of the relative shares of the two countries in the UMOA and the 
ratio of their real effective exchange rates was rather weak during the period  1965-82 
(- .25 using 1980 import shares) and basically disappeared in the 1970s (- .05). This was 
also the case, but to a lesser extent, of the correlation between money shares and relative 
consumer prices, which dropped from -  .35 to -  .15 between the two sample periods. 
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Comment  Liaquat Ahamed 
Macedo's  paper addresses two quite separate conceptual issues as- 
sociated with the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The first is 
the problem of the most appropriate exchange rate regime for a small 
African economy. The paper focuses specifically on the consequences 
for a small country of pegging its exchange rate to the currency of a 
large country, as each of the countries in UMOA have done with respect 
to the French franc. The second issue is the effect of  establishing a 
monetary union  among a number of  small countries, whereby  they 
share a common central bank and pool their foreign exchange reserves. 
Although both of these financial arrangements are found in the UMOA, 
it is important to keep them conceptually separate. It is perfectly pos- 
sible, for example, for each country in the UMOA to have singly pegged 
its exchange rate to the French franc without entering into the monetary 
union. By  the same token, a monetary union among the members of 
the  UMOA would  have  been  perfectly  feasible without  necessarily 
setting up a fixed exchange rate between the French franc and the franc 
of the UMOA. 
In a world of generalized floating exchange rates, why does a small 
country choose to peg its exchange rate to the currency of  a single 
large country  rather than  to some optimally  chosen basket  of  cur- 
rencies?  The  answer,  it  seems,  lies  in  the  credibility  of  the  two 
different quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes. When a developing coun- 
try pegs to a basket,  the credibility surrounding the maintenance of 
that  peg  depends  mainly  on  perceptions  about  the  policies  of  the 
government of  the developing country.  By  contrast,  in  an arrange- 
ment such as the UMOA, France is lending its authority to the peg. 
It is implicitly announcing that it will exert the necessary discipline 
on its African partners'  macroeconomic policies and will also provide 
to its  partners  the required  credit line to support the convertibility 
of  the UMOA franc  at the fixed peg.  Although  Macedo alludes to 
these  considerations,  particularly  the  effects  of  the  transfer  from 
France,  the  sort of  macroeconomic model  that  he  presents  in  his 
paper  is  not  really  an adequate  framework for formalizing the full 
range  of  benefits  accruing  from  the  peg  to the  French  franc.  The 
empirical section of  the paper  does, however,  contain a discussion 
of  some of the benefits. For example, the greater propensity to hold 
near-money  in the  Franc Zone  than  in  the  other African  countries 
is  highlighted in  the  paper.  This  financial  deepening  could  be  the 
consequence of an enhanced credibility regarding the stability of the 
exchange rate. 
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There are two types of  costs associated with the peg against the 
French franc. When a country fixes its exchange rate, it is renouncing 
the use of the nominal exchange rate as an instrument. This does not 
pose a problem for macroeconomic policy as long as domestic prices 
and wages are perfectly flexible. If, however, there is some degree of 
nominal price rigidity, one of the costs of a fixed exchange rate regime 
is the possibility of domestic unemployment in the event of an adverse 
shock, such as a fall in the demand for exports. A further cost arises 
when  a country  pegs  its  exchange rate to the  currency  of  another 
country. Here, the country is not merely renouncing an instrument. It 
is, in  effect, handing it over to the monetary authorities of  another 
country-in  this case France. The macroeconomic model outlined by 
Macedo does offer some insights into the costs of the fixed peg against 
the French franc. To complement the theoretical model, it would have 
been useful to have some empirical comparisons of the macroeconomic 
performance of the Franc Zone and that of the other African countries, 
particularly with regard to output growth, unemployment, and inflation. 
Let me now turn to the consequences of  establishing a monetary 
union. The first step is to clarify precisely what monetary arrangements 
and capital market policies bind a union together. At one extreme, for 
example, is the form of  union that prevails between Texas and Cali- 
fornia, whereby there is a free mobility of capital. As a consequence, 
the distribution of money stock between Texas and California is demand 
determined. A monetary allocation rule by the Federal Reserve Board 
would have no influence on such a monetary union. At the other ex- 
treme, one can envisage a monetary union in which there are controls 
on internal flows of capital so that each individual partner, within certain 
limits and for short periods of time, can pursue an independent mon- 
etary policy. The joint central bank in such a union would serve pri- 
marily as an institution for pooling and thus economizing on foreign 
exchange reserves. 
From the information provided in Macedo’s paper, I find it difficult 
to assess where to place the UMOA along this spectrum of  possible 
monetary unions. This not only has implications for the macroeconomic 
behavior of members of the UMOA but also for the efficiency of re- 
source use by the members. In terms of the formal model outlined in 
the paper, the question essentially boils down to one of specifying how 
the money supply is determined for each of the partners of the UMOA. 
Is the money  supply in each of the member  countries exogenously 
determined by the joint central bank, or are capital transactions among 
the member countries sufficiently fluid that it is endogenously deter- 
mined? The model the author uses is based on the assumption that the 
central bank can and does control the money supply in each member 
country. This assumption needs some justification. 365  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
In sum, although the paper and its model do provide some important 
insights into the workings of the UMOA, a broader conceptual frame- 
work is necessary to evaluate fully the costs and benefits of the mon- 
etary system embodied in the UMOA. 
Comment  Stephen O’Brien 
The author’s purpose in this paper has been to examine the costs and 
benefits,  within a monetary union, of  pegging to a single currency. 
Macedo demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, pegging to a single currency 
cannot be an optimal choice for the members of the union, and that, 
a fortiori, pegging to a fixed rate over the long term, as has been the 
case for the West African Monetary Union (UMOA), must be subop- 
timal. Nevertheless, he concludes that on balance the union has been 
beneficial to its members, when the transfers from France through the 
“operations account” are taken into account, and probably has been 
on balance a net benefit to France as well, at least until 1977 when the 
overall foreign asset position of the UMOA began to deteriorate sharply. 
It is precisely these broader issues of the overall costs and benefits 
of such a monetary system for developing countries that is of particular 
relevance, I believe, for the theme of this volume: structural adjustment 
and the real exchange rate. In this brief comment I would like to draw 
on some of the points raised in the paper to examine further these costs 
and benefits. 
On the cost side the lack of national control over exchange rate policy 
clearly must be flagged. The author points out that there have been 
significant changes in the real exchange rates of UMOA member coun- 
tries; and in recent years those changes have had adverse effects on 
the development of  several of the members’ economies. At the same 
time the members have been constrained in their ability to adjust to 
these changes. (Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the ma- 
jority of the other African countries that have had the freedom to pursue 
an active exchange rate policy have not done so.) Along with the loss 
of freedom to determine exchange rates, the UMOA members have 
been forced to rely on second-best instruments for balance-of-payments 
management: subsidies, tariffs, quantitative restrictions, price controls, 
and so on. In recent years, member countries  such as Ivory coast, 
Senegal, and Togo have intensified their use of those policy instruments 
in pursuit of  stabilization and structural adjustment.  It is too early, 
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however, to assess the impact of these policy adjustments, or to com- 
pare these examples with countries that have relied primarily on ex- 
change rate movements. 
With respect to benefits the author rightly mentions the importance 
of  the French transfer, but any full assessment of  the UMOA cannot 
be based  only on  the operations  account.  This account is only the 
cornerstone of the relationship between France and the African mem- 
ber states, a relationship that also includes trade, investment, technical 
assistance, and various forms of concessional aid. French underwriting 
of the deficits of  the union, and its assurance of  the convertibility of 
the CFA franc, also facilitates trade and capital flows (but not signifi- 
cantly increased trade among the UMOA members). Another important 
benefit the union confers is the fiscal and monetary discipline it imposes 
on its members under the rules of the West African Central Bank. There 
are indications, however, that this discipline has been weakening since 
the late  1970s, as all the member countries have faced severe fiscal 
problems leading to the accumulation  of domestic arrears and other 
manifestations of internal imbalance. This has contributed to the rapid 
buildup in the operations account. Although the UMOA still represents 
only a negligible share of the French money stock, there nevertheless 
exists the possibility, as the author mentions, that  France might be 
compelled to change the rules of the monetary “game”  in response to 
the rising burden placed on the French Treasury by the union. 
Finally, in support of the thesis that the union, and the associated 
linkages with France, confers a net benefit on its African members, 
one can point to both its durability and its growth prospects. It is truly 
remarkable, given the rather disappointing record of regional organi- 
zations in Africa, that the UMOA has lasted for over 40 years, and for 
some 25 years since the independence of the member states. And the 
union is likely to expand rather than contract. Mali reentered the UMOA 
in  1984. (The author speculates that Mali may have wished to rejoin 
so as to receive the transfer necessitated by its persistently negative 
operations account through UMOA rather than directly from France; 
one could argue instead that France encouraged the Malian reentry on 
the grounds that the fiscal and monetary discipline mentioned above 
could be more effectively applied through the union than bilaterally.) 
Other countries are likely to follow: Guinea, possibly Mauritania in 
time, and even nonfrancophone countries such as Guinea-Bissau and 
Gambia, following the example of Equatorial Guinea and the Central 
African Monetary Union. 
This paper has provided us with useful information and analysis on 
the functioning of the UMOA and its impact on its members. Further 
research  on the union  and  its  developmental significance is clearly 
warranted. This is so for at least two reasons: first, because the union 367  Collective Pegging to a Single Currency 
has demonstrated its staying power and is almost certain to become 
more important in the economy of West Africa in the future; and sec- 
ond, because at the same time, the members of the union are collec- 
tively experiencing the most severe economic crisis they have faced 
since independence, and this crisis is putting heavy pressure on the 
union and its financial links with France. This Page Intentionally Left Blank